The Agony of the Russian Idea
By Tim McDaniel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. 201 pp., $24.95.
Russian philosophers in the late 1800s were the first to use the phrase "the Russian idea" to refer to a set of what they believed to be uniquely Russian cultural and
societal ideals that rejected the individualism arising in Europe, and to extol community as the building block of a great Russian society. For Tim McDaniel, the
agony of the Russian idea stems from the tension between the superficial use it was put to by both tsarist and Soviet leaders attempting to inspire nationalism and
loyalty to the state, and the great meaning and hope it gave to many Russians struggling to come to terms with a history of serfdom and oppression.
Today, McDaniel argues, the Russian idea handicaps leaders in their effort to rid the country of communal ideals and adapt it to the individualism of the free market and democracy. To create a political environment in which Russians could be thrust into democracy, President Boris Yeltsin should have likened "modified ideals" from the Russian idea, such as equality, to democratic and capitalist ideals. Instead, his government called for a total break with the Russian idea, a move that devalued the Russian idea, increased peoples' fear of change, and led to political apathy.
Unfortunately for the reader, McDaniel does not outline how the government could build policies based on the Russian idea that would foster political participation and create a Russian democracy. But McDaniel's insights do give the reader a deep understanding of the mentality born of the Russian idea and its overlooked role in Russians' struggle to trust democracy and adapt to the market. His authoritative analysis is an essential resource for understanding the old and new Russia in all its agony, ideological and political.
Rachel P. Roberts
The New Military in Russia:
Ten Myths That Shape the Image
By Richard F. Staar. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 272 pp., $41.95.
Drawing on his extensive knowledge of the post-Soviet military, Richard Staar sets forth in The New Military in Russia his fears about the future intentions and
capabilities of the Russian Federation's armed forces. Staar, who once served as President Ronald Reagan's ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction talks, remains wary of a renewed and dangerous Russian military. He structures his work around 10 "myths" Western experts believe about the Russian
armed forces.
Despite his meticulous research, Staar does not present a central thesis for his work. Without a clear focus, the reader is left to decipher confusing and often contradictory tables and flowcharts, as well as the brief résumés of 100 "key military figures." Though Staar's research would seem more than sufficient to support a lucid presentation of trends in Russian foreign policy, he believes that the cold war is only "supposedly over" and therefore emphasizes issues such as the strength of Russian anti-ballistic missile systems and a purported Russian nuclear advantage. He criticizes Russia for selling offensive weapons abroad to maintain its military-industrial complex.
As a compilation of "myths," Staar's work is fragmented and difficult for the nonspecialist to follow. This anxious and vague book leaves the reader without direction in a forest of detail and thus unprepared for the author's startling conclusions. He predicts a remilitarized Russia either torn by continual internal conflict or dominated by a military dictator. Though Russia's future is far from certain, the reader will not be convinced by Staar's pessimistic forecast that the West must prepare for a new Russian military threat.
Dan Green