In a New York Times interview just weeks before the start of his second term, President Bill Clinton said that pursuing free trade agreements with Latin American countries would be among his highest priorities. The president seemed prepared to fight for, and likely secure, so-called fast track authority to negotiate trade agreements that Congress could vote up or down but not amend.
But in November 1997 Clinton became the first president since 1974 to be denied such authority. The administration's inability to obtain fast track from Congress represented Clinton's worst political defeat since the health care fiasco early on in his presidency. It marked a sharp setback for United States hemispheric--indeed, global--credibility and leadership.
Ironically, the defeat took place on the heels of presidential trips to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Barbados in May, and to Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina in October. The trips were meant in part to demonstrate the importance and appeal of Latin America to a United States public largely indifferent to the region and anxious about the uncertainties of the global economy.
The politics of the fast track defeat reinforced a sense that United States policy toward Latin America was increasingly driven and dominated by domestic interests and constituencies. Labor unions, led by the AFL-CIO, were instrumental in opposing the fast track proposal. Though Clinton, a Democrat, had ample Republican support, he was unable to muster more than one-fifth of his own party's votes in the House of Representatives.
If any element of hemispheric policy had broad purpose that transcended domestic politics and seemed to enjoy some measure of consensus in both the United States and Latin America it was, presumably, trade. Yet the fast track disappointment revealed that this issue could easily fall victim to political obstructionism and infighting. In this light, fashioning coherent United States policy toward the region appears increasingly problematic. Tellingly, in another extensive Times interview in December 1997, Clinton neglected to mention free trade, or any other hemispheric goal, as part of his agenda for the remaining years of his presidency.
Although relations between the United States and Latin America have improved since the 1980s, the potential for more productive engagement in the post-cold war period has not been realized. On the trade issue--the centerpiece of the relationship--the Clinton administration has failed to develop a focused and sustained strategy, partly because of ambivalence about the issue's politics and the schisms it might accentuate within the Democratic Party. Further, as illustrated by the president's trips to the region, the administration has dealt with trade in very different ways, depending on the country or subregion. Other key issues such as immigration, narcotics, and security have readily yielded to the appetites of various bureaucratic interests and political constituencies. The administration has treated issues individually and in a mostly ad hoc fashion, without considering their connections to other policies.
A review of recent United States-Latin American relations underlines what is well known and has long been the case: that domestic interests exert a powerful influence on foreign policy and that incoherence is more the norm than the exception.
Why does United States policy toward Latin America appear more fragmented and susceptible to domestic constituencies than in the past--and why is it more apparent in this area than in American policy toward Asia or Africa? The difference stems from the imperatives of geography, history, and culture, which are increasingly manifested politically. While this tendency may have the virtue of making policymaking more democratic and participatory, it can also produce ineffective and counterproductive results. Many Latin Americans are puzzled about precisely what the United States is up to, especially when it has an unprecedented opportunity for a more productive relationship.
For example, the United States has for years espoused the virtues of economic reform--including trade liberalization and privatization--as the basis for prosperity. In the 1990s, with nearly every Latin American government embracing the reform recipe, it seemed likely that trade would become the defining motif of hemispheric policy.
Building on President George Bush's 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which called for a hemisphere-wide free trade system, President Clinton--in what some regard as among the greatest achievements of his presidency--received congressional approval in 1993 for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that had been negotiated a year earlier. And a year later, at the Summit of the Americas gathering of hemispheric leaders in Miami, the United States, Canada, and Mexico announced that they would soon make Chile a fourth NAFTA member. The most important news coming out of the summit was a hemisphere-wide agreement to complete negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005.
The fast track disappointment raises serious questions about the reliability of the United States as a hemispheric partner. To paraphrase Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim's commentary following President Clinton's withdrawal of the bill, the "Washington consensus" on key economic tenets seemed to have taken hold throughout the hemisphere--with the possible exception of Washington. The setback has led policymakers and summit organizers to reconsider what can be fruitfully discussed at this April's assembly of the hemisphere's heads of state in Santiago, Chile.
Even before the fast track defeat there were signs that the adminstration's push for a pro-trade hemispheric policy was in trouble. On several occasions Congress had voted down Clinton administration-backed Caribbean Basin Initiative enhancement legislation that would have given favorable treatment to the small Central American and Caribbean countries most affected by NAFTA. With development assistance levels plummeting and trade measures thwarted, a Central American official quipped that at least the United States had delivered on half its new policy of "trade, not aid."
The consequences of the fast track setback for United States-Latin American relations were chiefly psychological and symbolic. The decision affected United States credibility in the hemisphere by sending a signal that the president was unable to deliver on fundamental commitments about free trade. At the same time, political problems notwithstanding, the unrelenting forces of trade, technology, and private capital continue to drive hemispheric countries toward greater integration.
Latin America is the fastest growing region in the world for United States exports. By the first decade of the next century, it is expected to be the world's primary market for American products and services, exceeding Europe and Japan combined. Mexico already rivals the Japanese market. United States exports to Brazil totaled some $13 billion in 1996, roughly two and a half times the 1990 figure and more than the $10 billion in 1996 American exports to China. The United States sells more to Central America than to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union together. Further, cumulative foreign direct investment flows from the United States to Latin America from 1990 to 1995 reached nearly $66 billion, roughly 58 percent of the region's total foreign investment. This year total direct foreign investment is expected to be about $30 billion, with the United States again contributing approximately half.
Intraregional trade has also expanded dramatically. Apart from NAFTA, the most significant subregional trade pact is Mercosur, the Common Market of the South that was set up in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, with Bolivia and Chile as associate members. With a combined current GDP of approximately $1 trillion, Mercosur has started to negotiate free trade agreements with the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and the European Union. On this score Central America has been similarly vigorous: both trade within the region and exports are growing at nearly 25 percent per year.
If the strength and quality of United States-Latin American relations could be judged by the number of meetings that take place, then it would be easy to argue that the relationship has never been better. The summit process, and heightened post-cold war regional and subregional activity, have resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of inter-American contacts. Much of this has been spurred by a move toward market economics, trade liberalization, and financial integration, and reinforced by a political setting of reduced tensions and the spread of democratically elected governments.
Clinton's two trips to the region in 1997 exemplified this welcome shift. Yet the visits also highlighted the vastly different policy priorities posed by two subregions that render any general reference to the "Latin American agenda" problematic. Even on trade, which is important to all the countries Clinton visited, the focus of the discussions varied appreciably. In Mexico, the main concern related to problems associated with the implementation of NAFTA; the Central American and Caribbean countries pressed for concessional trade support from the United States to help offset the diversion of investment to Mexico; and Brazil and Argentina, after receiving mixed signals from American officials, were anxious for clarity from the president on policy toward Mercosur. It would be difficult to discern a common thread on even the most positive, consensual item on the United States-Latin American agenda.
Trade aside, the agenda consists of an array of problems that are to a considerable extent specific to certain countries or subregions, and that are seldom viewed by United States officials in relation to one another. Propinquity, for example, made immigration a central concern on Clinton's visit to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean--but completely irrelevant to the South American trip. America's closest neighbors are irritated about the relatively harsh, more restrictive immigration legislation adopted in 1996 in response to mounting political pressures. Partly as a result of such legislation and partly because of improved enforcement, the United States has deported a record number of Mexicans, Central Americans, and Caribbeans. During Clinton's visit, Mexican officials also expressed concern about welfare reform measures that deprived their nationals in the United States of key benefits.
Though the harshest features of the welfare reform legislation as it relates to immigrants were remedied and softened last year, the issue of immigration remains enormously sensitive as the subregion's governments press for greater humanitarian consideration (on the grounds, for example, of keeping families together) and, at the least, better bureaucratic coordination and communication. Most striking is that the new United States immigration policy was apparently devised without any serious regard for its foreign policy implications-for example, how the legislation's probable results of increased deportations and reduced remittances might affect key United States policy objectives of supporting economic development, social progress, and democratic consolidation in postwar El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. There is little evidence that such questions were even raised before the new immigration legislation was adopted.
United States officials also failed to adequately consider Latin American sensibilities in security policy. Two critical decisions were made last year. In early August, the Clinton administration decided to lift a two-decade ban on sales of advanced weapons to Latin America. Proponents stressed that because Latin America was now a democratic region, the justification for the original ban no longer applied. American arms manufacturers also weighed in against the ban, pressuring Congress and the administration. They argued that because governments in the region were getting what they wanted from any number of dealers in the competitive arms market, American companies--and workers--should benefit. Critics, led by Oscar Arias, the former Costa Rican president and Nobel Peace Prize winner, raised questions about the consequences for regional peace and stability.
Whatever its merits, the end to the ban provoked a tepid response at best in South America. Argentina, perhaps the United States strongest ally in the region, criticized the decision; it was concerned about keeping its military's demands in check. Brazil was ambivalent on similar grounds. Even Chile, which had announced plans for major purchases of military hardware and presumably stood to benefit most from the decision, deeply resented statements by United States officials that it had lobbied for the change.
The second security-related decision--Washington's proposal to make Argentina a non-NATO ally--was taken three weeks after the ban on arms sales was lifted. This, however, did more to aggravate than alleviate Latin American anxieties about United States designs. The designation, which was made in recognition of Argentina's close collaboration with the United States and active participation in various peacekeeping operations, was also an attempt to mollify Argentine concerns about a possible arms buildup in Chile.
Instead, the announcement backfired, rekindling longstanding suspicions among Chile, Argentina, and Brazil; it especially vexed Chileans, who bristled at the strategic cold war overlay of the non-NATO category. The two security-related decisions did little to build confidence between the United States and Latin America in anticipation of the April 1998 summit, which was to be hosted, after all, by Chile.
The issue of narcotics was at the top of Clinton's agenda on his first Latin American visit (although it barely came up on the second). For the United States, the issue is of paramount importance in its relationship with Mexico since an estimated 70 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States passes through Mexico. Narcotics also figured prominently in Clinton's meetings in Central America and the Caribbean, where drug-related activities--trafficking, money laundering, and consumption--are reportedly on the rise.
Few United States policies have irritated Latin Americans as much as its approach toward illicit narcotics. The largely unilateral, punitive, counterproductive strategy had long failed to acknowledge properly the overwhelming demand and consumption of drugs in the United States--as well as the disproportionate costs, human and financial, borne by Latin Americans. Perhaps most offensive has been the 1986 law Congress passed requiring the "certification" of certain countries each year for their cooperation with the United States in combating drugs. "Decertified" countries are subject to sanctions and denied foreign assistance and United States votes for loans at international financial institutions. Washington analysts from across the political spectrum have aptly characterized this process as a "circus."1
In 1996 and 1997, the United States decertified Colombia, a democratic, historically friendly country. Colombian President Ernesto Samper's United States visa was also revoked because he was accused of having received drug money from the Cali cartel during his 1994 election campaign. The congressional debate in early 1997 about the possible decertification of Mexico, whose own drug czar was found to be corrupt, touched a raw nerve in Mexico and revived suspicions and resentment in both countries. Though in the end Mexico was not decertified, the episode revealed the inconsistency, indeed the absurdity, of the policy.
In addition, few United States policies have been as conditioned by domestic politics and bureaucratic and turf battles as its narcotics strategy. Pressures to "get tough" with producers and traffickers in the region, and protect "our children" from drugs, inevitably intensify as elections near. Hard-line approaches often yield political rewards.
Still, for a variety of reasons, there is growing recognition within the United States policy community that the certification process is not working. The drug problem remains, and Colombia--the policy's principal target in the hemisphere--is deteriorating substantially, with an increasingly critical security and human rights situation involving various configurations of guerrilla groups, paramilitary organizations, the armed forces, and drug traffickers. The current approach certainly has not caused the crisis, but it has contributed to it by significantly weakening the ability of Colombia's legitimate government to maintain order. It also strains cooperation with other hemispheric governments on a range of key issues.
Signs of a change in thinking can be discerned. One of the most noteworthy statements of Clinton's Mexico visit, for example, was his public acknowledgment that the drug problem constituted a "shared responsibility" between both countries. In his September 1997 report to Congress, United States drug czar General Barry McCaffrey outlined a more genuinely cooperative, multilateral strategy to deal with the narcotics problem. The proposed approach at least points in a direction that goes beyond the series of bilateral agreements between the United States and other hemispheric governments that often passes for "multilateralism." McCaffrey also rankled some State Department officials by meeting with Samper in Colombia last October, thus underlining differences about the prevailing policy.
Last July a resolution presented by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ) that proposed a two-year moratorium on the certification process and a serious exploration of alternative, multilateral approaches to the drug problem was rejected, 60 to 38. Despite its defeat, the initiative constituted a challenge to current policy and revealed a willingness to entertain fresh ideas. The resolution received Clinton administration backing (albeit considerably delayed).
The presidential trips were also accompanied by some encouraging signs of a recognition that the political landscape in the region has changed. Clinton's Mexico visit was distinguished not only by his welcome statement on drugs, but also by his unprecedented meeting with opposition political figures less than two months before perhaps the most significant election in Latin America last year.
For the first time since its founding nearly 70 years ago, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost control of one house of Congress, breaking its authoritarian grip and creating more competitive political dynamics. The change was symbolized in early December when Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) founder and two-time presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas became mayor of Mexico City (one of the world's largest metropolitan areas) and the country's second most powerful elected official.
Clinton followed a similar script in Argentina, just weeks before the country's congressional elections. He met with five key opposition figures of the newly formed Alliance, which won an unexpectedly huge victory, defeating the governing Peronist Party and injecting a greater measure of pluralism into Argentine politics. After Mexico this was probably the most important election in Latin America last year. These contests set the stage for crucial presidential elections in Mexico (2000) and Argentina (1999). In both countries Clinton was especially deft in balancing his proper treatment of the president (Ernesto Zedillo in Mexico and Carlos Menem in Argentina) with his open contact with alternative political forces. A decade ago, in a cold war setting, such diplomacy would have been difficult to imagine.
The issue that most dramatically underscores the extent to which United States-Latin American policy is fixed is Cuba. Though cold war concerns are, objectively speaking, obsolete, United States policy toward Cuba is still largely stuck in cold war logic and thinking, the prisoner of powerful domestic political interests. Though Cuba is not high on the inter-American agenda, virtually every Latin American and Caribbean government rejected the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which mandates penalties against foreign firms investing in or doing business on Cuban property confiscated from Americans after the 1959 Cuban revolution. The region's governments also fear that the American approach may be increasing the prospects for violence in Cuba when change does occur, rather than advancing the stated United States goal of a peaceful, democratic transition.
Apart from Colombia and Cuba, there are some other trouble spots that could soon pose a serious challenge for United States policy and the broader hemispheric community. The situation in Haiti is, according to one leading analyst, "slowly drifting toward chaos."2 Along with NAFTA, the successful return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti in September 1994 was one of the Clinton administration's major achievements in hemispheric policy, showing a commitment to democracy. Though the United States is keeping between 300 and 500 troops in the country, conditions could deteriorate.
Multilateral cooperation will also be essential to manage other potential problems in the region in the near future. Though border hostilities between Peru and Ecuador have ended thanks to the efforts of the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile--the four guarantor countries of the 1942 Rio Protocol, which ended the 1941 war between Peru and Ecuador--the dispute remains unresolved and could erupt again. Paraguay, too, presents enormous difficulties and may call for a regional response similar to the backing the constitutional government received when General Lino Oviedo attempted a military coup in 1996. Today there is considerable tension in the country, with Oviedo's claim to be his party's presidential candidate for the May 1998 elections disputed by President Juan Carlos Wasmosy and others. And the situation in Panama also remains unclear. The United States and Panamanian governments reached a tentative agreement in December 1997 that would allow an estimated 2,000 American troops to remain in the country after the United States gives up control of the Panama Canal at the end of 1999. The troops would be members of a multinational force assigned to a regional counternarcotics center. But the United States faces the formidable and complicated task of marshaling broad support from other hemispheric governments, apart from the possible political fallout in a country it invaded less than a decade ago.
The most significant potential challenge to United States hemispheric policy is Brazil, which at the end of 1997 responded quickly and decisively to cope with the effects of the Asian financial crisis. How a country with some 40 percent of the region's GDP and population deals with such a challenge will surely have enormous regional repercussions. The sobering situation further underscores the continued vulnerability and volatility of Latin American economies.
The United States should stand ready to lead a rescue package to support Brazil or other Latin American countries affected by the financial turmoil in Asia, just as it did in Mexico in 1995. That policy, resisted by Congress and American public opinion, was largely successful, as evidenced by Mexico's impressive growth and early repayment of the assistance provided. But the prevailing political mood in the United States means that acting boldly will not be easy.
In the wake of the fast track defeat, the Clinton administration can also take other measures to enhance its credibility in the region (although it is important for the president to remain focused on getting Congress to vote on a resubmitted fast track bill early this year). Even failing that, the United States could give renewed attention to Caribbean and Central American countries by putting forward a new NAFTA-parity legislative measure, as well as beginning to consult systematically with other hemispheric governments about labor and environmental standards.3
These steps would send an important signal that the United States is prepared to develop a serious and coherent hemispheric strategy that transcends often parochial, narrow interests. Such a strategy would have to consider the connections among such key issues as trade, immigration, narcotics, and security--and be grounded firmly in United States interests and values. Presidential visits are welcome, but they are no substitute for a willingness to spend political capital and exercise leadership to build a hemispheric partnership. Only then can United States-Latin American relations slowly become unstuck.
MICHAEL SHIFTER is a senior fellow and program director in democratic governance at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C., and adjunct professor of latin American studies at Georgetown University.
1 See Mark Falcoff, "Time to End the Certification Circus," Latin American Outlook, April 1997; and Coletta Youngers, "De Nuevo Bajo La Bendictión de Tío Sam," Enlace, Washington Office on Latin America, April 1997
2 Donald E. Shultz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?" Parameters, Winter 1997-98, p. 77.
3 Peter Hakim, "What the Administration Can Do to Make up for the Loss of Fast Track," The Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 1997, p. 19.